

THE PILOT

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Editorial

As all pilots know there are frequently occasions where a pilotage act is undertaken which utilises all the skills and experience accrued during a pilot's career. I recently undertook such an act and whilst unwinding after its successful conclusion there were two key elements that occurred to me. Firstly, having transited the approach channel constantly adjusting for leeway of between 4 and 8 degrees depending on wind gusts and also passing other vessels at close range this transit underlined what all pilots know in that such a passage would be impossible to conduct from a VTS centre no matter how sophisticated the equipment or how experienced the VTS operator might be.

The other point was to question why on earth the shipping and ports representatives are putting up such a strong resistance to the incorporation of pilotage qualifications and standards into the PMSC. Under BPIT, pilots produced the necessary National Occupational Standards and all that is required is for these to be formally integrated into the Code. With the insurers highlighting the escalating level of claims allegedly resulting from pilot error (see page 10) one would expect that ports and shipowners would wish to ensure that pilots are recruited and trained to the highest standards especially since it was only through an out of court settlement that Milford Haven avoided a court action brought by the Oil Pollution Compensation Fund for failing to train the pilot of the *Sea Empress* to an acceptable standard of competence. Regrettably the risks of another major pilotage incident in a UK port are seemingly being trivialised. With the pilot standards document effectively shelved by the apparently dormant port run body of Port Skills and Safety Ltd. (PSSL) there now also appears to be a growing movement to kill off the Education, Training, Certification & Standards (ETCS) programme for maritime pilots currently running in Europe. The old insurance adage of "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident" has never been more relevant!

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MARTIN LEE

Last "Grand Mat" of the AICH (UK branch)

It is with sadness that I have to report the passing away of retired Trinity House (latterly Medway) pilot Martin Lee. Many will remember Martin for his enthusiasm for the "wind ships", one of the last of which was the Passat where Martin served much of his apprenticeship in the late 1940s. As one of a dwindling number of true "Cape Horners" who had sailed around Cape Horn in a commercial sailing ship not fitted with an engine Martin became the last "Grand Mat" of the UK branch of the L'Amicale Internationale des Capitaines au Long-Cours Cap Horniers (AICH) and had the sad task of formally winding up that Association as a result of the dwindling membership in 2003. At that time I contacted Martin for an account of the Association and his experiences and he sent me two articles. The following is an account of sailing ship handling skills now a dying art and the other article on the AICH is on pages 8&9.



Martin Lee with Captain Michenov on board the *Sedov* in a stiff N Easter inward to Chatham in April 1998. (Pilot: T Lyons)

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The evocative cartoon in the June 2004 edition of *The Pilot* concerning a sailing ship running at a fair speed into harbour is reminiscent of some of the manoeuvres which sailing ship masters, pilots and crews had to make in the 1930s and 1940s. Their vessels were all in the region of 3,500 to 5,000 tons deadweight, had no motive power except their sails, no bow thrusters and two large (up to 3 tons) anchors forward. There were one or two exceptions such as the German four-masted barque *Magdalene Vinnen / Kommodore Johnson* (now the Russian *Sedov*) which, in those days had a small auxiliary diesel engine for helping in calm conditions but not much use for manoeuvring in any tide or breeze. Some vessels still had their stern anchor hawse-pipes and gear which had been used in Chilean and Peruvian anchorage ports. Erikson (Gustaf Erikson of Mariehamn in the Finnish Aland Islands) masters were expected, like most Scandinavian masters,



Passat under full sail in ballast

to avoid the use of expensive tugs when-ever possible. Incidentally G Erikson have recently sold their last reefer ship and are no longer ship owners in the accepted sense.

Pilots will readily understand the reference to a kick astern when there is no such thing available. Ports such as Port Lincoln, Wallaroo and Bunbury in Australia where ships berthed alongside were places where the master was expected to berth and unberth his ship unaided. I have a copy of the port charges for various Erikson vessels at Port Lincoln in the 1930s. The four-masted barque *Passat* in February 1937 incurred a total of £299 13s 6d harbour dues including £63 pilotage, boatmen and mooring £12.

These charges were for berthing, shifting to and from the ballast grounds and sailing when loaded. There are no tug charges. These vessels had to have a minimum of 300 tons of solid ballast in port and over 1,300 tons for a deep sea voyage, this stuff was manhandled by the crew and required shifting the ship with half the cargo loaded out to the ballast ground and dumping the material over the side before returning for cargo completion.

Berthing one of these ships required the right conditions and a great deal of skill and hard work, it could be lengthy business – it took us most of the day and a great deal of sweat and shouting to

get the *Passat* alongside the long, winding jetty in Bunbury with no assistance. We had arrived on 4 September 1947 in ballast from East London.

In East London we were head out on the south side of the Buffalo River and when the tug and pilot arrived there was an offshore breeze. Captain Hagerstrand was a man of few words, he never spoke to us in English but conversed well in that language with others; he also rarely swore. The date was 14 April 1947, I was standing by the big double wheels ready for action, the master said “we don’t need the tug, we will sail the ship out to sea.” As he spoke there was a rain squall and the wind shifted to a fresh on the berth breeze. The air then became blue with a mixture of Swedish, Finnish and English oaths – we had to take the tug to get us off the berth. The voyage was 4,331 miles in a time of 20 days 17 hours at an average speed of 8.7 knots, this compares favourably with tramp steamers making passages at 7 knots and consuming large amounts of fuel. On arrival off Bunbury the pilot came on board and said that the tug was away in Fremantle but we could use the local dredger to help us alongside. The master weighed it all up, we dropped the starboard anchor off the end of the jetty, swung head to wind, the gallant dredger took a line aft and at the first tow pulled her bitts out of the deck. I did not hear any language from amidships but we eventually hove her alongside with hand capstans with no further assistance. We loaded a full cargo (4,700 tons) of jarrah wood railway sleepers for Port Swettenham (now Port Klang) in Malaya, the ship was down to her marks and we sailed on 17 October 1947 with a fair wind off the berth. We had mastheaded the upper tops’ls before sailing so a good spread of canvas was immediately available and sailed quietly away with no tug and no fuss. Mooring at a single buoy in Port Swettenham was a different story, we took two harbour tugs. We then proceeded, with sand ballast, to Port Victoria in the Spencer Gulf in South Australia to load grain in the traditional manner. Arriving there on 2 March 1948 we found the four-masted barques *Lawhill* and *Viking* loading in Hardwicke



Captain Hagerstrand

Bay. Port Victoria is an anchorage port with poor holding ground, some Erikson masters who had been in the trade for years, detested the place and wrote of the 'merry-go-round' of dragging anchors round the bay. We put two anchors down and kept good anchor watches, sometimes a spanker was set and a spring attached to the weather anchor to make a lee for the ketches bringing bagged barley out.

Sailing ships had larger anchors and cables, as required by the classification societies, but, without the benefit of a kick ahead. The shores of Wardang Island in Hardwicke Bay have the remnants of several square-riggers which did not survive the 'merry-go-round'.

Large square-rigged ships loaded phosphates and guano in remote places such as Astove Island, Nosse Be and other delightful places in the 1920s and 1930s. There were no tugs available there and great skill was required to get these ships into position in a restricted area where there was sufficient depth for anchors to hold. The four-masted barque *Olivebank* was chartered to load guano for Auckland, at Assumption Island, N of Madagascar, in 1928. She shipped 84 men from Mahe to do the loading and anchored in 80 fathoms, a ship's length off the island. Two days later her anchors slipped off the ledge into precipitous depths and it took her two weeks to get back and anchor in 12 fathoms forward and 84 fathoms aft with the vessel 80 metres off the land. Captain Troberg had had enough of guano sailing after this! When the *Pamir* was seized in Wellington in 1941 she had just arrived from Assumption. Two pilots had leapt on board as she approached in a southerly gale and sailed her through the narrow harbour entrance off Pencarrow – she stayed under the NZ flag for a further 8 years sailing across the Pacific to NW America and Canada, with one voyage to London in 1948.

As a River Medway (ex-Thames) pilot I sailed the replica *Golden Hind* from Upnor to Tower Pier in the 1970s. This was (is) a small ship, she had an underpowered engine set on the starboard side. We sailed up the Thames on a rising tide for an ETA at Tower Bridge and arrived on time with cannon blazing and under full sail. I had already explained to Captain Adrian Small (we had been apprentices together on the *Passat*) that the next bridge does not open. We still had a following wind and flood tide and there was



Golden Hind



Passat leaves Bunbury under sail

much shouting as we rounded the *Belfast* with sails flogging and finally made our way to Tower Pier. As her temporary master and pilot we shifted her a few times in the Upper Pool (always in the middle of the night of course), she had been fitted with under water buoyancy bulges which were invisible from the deck. Making the entrance lock at St Catherine's could be quite interesting; we actually sailed in stern first on one occasion as the wind was so strong from ahead.

In 1996 and 1997 after a change of direction from piloting to other matters I spent two hurricane seasons in the Caribbean as a master on the four-masted barquentine *Star Clipper*. This vessel and her sister ship *Star Flyer* were built in Belgium in the early 1990s, their hull size was similar to that of the German 'P' ships – 106m x 14.7m. There the similarity ends, they carry up to 174 passengers in five-star luxury, have two swimming pools a main engine and bow thrust and comply with the very strict USCG requirements for cruise ships as well as the myriad of other needs with strange labels. Their square sails on the fore-mast are controlled by a push-button system, eg 'lower tops'l out and lower tops'l in'. A magic device that would have amazed any watch-keeper on a proper sailing vessel. Their rigging mistakes are the massive main and mizzen fisherman sails set high up. They have to come in quickly in squalls and often jam in their tracks causing heavy heeling and ominous crashes from the galley and bar.

We sailed whenever possible and carried out manoeuvres such as getting under way from an anchorage under sail alone, tacking, wearing, boxing and other crew heavy (assisted by passengers) work. She was not the easiest ship to handle with her windage aloft and a not too powerful engine. We did manage a mediterranean moor in St Georges when both berths were occupied, two anchors down and backed up to the space between the two ships putting crossed stern lines ashore. Approaching Castries (St. Lucia), after sending an ETA for the pilot for 0600, there was no sign of the boat so, of course, we berthed the ship head in quite successfully – he came along later to apologise and

get his note signed !

Hurricane Iris was avoided by staying alongside in Barbados until the newly joined passengers sent a delegation to say that they had paid for a sailing cruise and demanded to sail. The weather was moderating with fewer large seas over the breakwater, we had the hurricane movement forecast, ordered the tug and sailed round the breakwater into a heavy swell causing much sea-sickness – still they had paid for it. The difficulty then was to find a sheltered anchorage for a visit ashore but every place was occupied by other ships. Soufrierre Bay was tried but we rolled heavily and motored away. This was not exactly sailing ship stuff but was an experience of a different kind.

In this brave new world of endless lists of acronyms and the minutiae of bureaucracy there seems to be little said about the nuts and bolts of shiphandling etc. When the first generation of car carriers made their appearance at Sheerness's new car terminal they were a conglomerate of cobbled together ex bulk carriers and passenger ships. On one occasion one of these hybrid monsters had been advised to wait for the strong N'ly wind to moderate. Early in the morning I boarded her in the Little Nore area (this was in the days of Trinity House Pilots). She was a huge slab sided thing and we had three tugs standing by, the wind was moderating as we wandered into the harbour, and then shifted to the ENE, which was fine on our port bow for the berth. It was a tight squeeze (this was the original car berth at the end of No. 3 Sheerness), after mooring up the senior tug master called up and said "you sailed that ship alongside". This was a compliment which I have always been proud of – in fact those vessels have much the same windage as a four-masted barque under full sail and can, in a way, be treated as such. The links between ship handling and seamanship in the 1930s and 1940s in unpowered



Star Clipper and Star Flyer

ships and the 21st century vessel may be tenuous in terms of motive power but pilots will always have to deal competently with situations demanding a skilful response and perhaps the bean counters are not fully aware of this.

Martin Lee

Ex-Orwell, -Thames, -Medway and MPA Pilot

VTS FAILURE

DANISH authorities are probing why a VTS system installed on the Great Belt Bridge to monitor shipping traffic failed to raise the alarm before the multipurpose container ship *Karen Danielsen* collided with the 18km suspension bridge early in March this year.

The Danish Ministry of Defence's Sovaernet confirmed that the VTS surveillance had failed as the 3,630dwt vessel headed off course into the lower western section of the bridge between the islands of Funen and Zealand. The chief officer was alone on watch at the time and was tragically killed in the collision and the Captain was hospitalised with several broken ribs, with three more crew suffering from minor injuries. All the Officers and crew were Croatian.

The Danish owned, Bahamas flagged, 1985-built cargo vessel sustained major damage with the wheelhouse, foremast, funnel and cranes being ripped off as it passed beneath an 18 metre high western span of the bridge.

The accident was the worst ever since the bridge opened in 1998, leaving it badly damaged in one section but otherwise structurally intact.

An autopsy report on the Chief Officer revealed that he had at least 1.55 grams of alcohol in his blood and investigators said this level could explain the navigation error,

The ship was travelling in ballast from the Fyn island to Finland, but failed to alter course and headed north instead of east and thus collided with the bridge.

The Danish coastal authorities admitted that this accident should never have happened because the Great Belt is monitored by radar and cameras which should immediately alert the authorities when a vessel leaves the shipping lane and gets too close to the bridge. The Danish navy's operational command has admitted that it bore "some of the responsibility" for the collision since it had failed to alert the ship that it was heading straight for

the bridge and they have indicated that this failure was due to human error.

This is the first case that I am aware of that has directly implicated a VTS system in a major incident and the subsequent enquiry will no doubt raise important questions over liability of VTS operators. With the increasing involvement of pilots in VTS centres many have expressed concerns over the potential liabilities which could arise, not just to the authority concerned but also individual operators, when a vessel is navigating in an area monitored by a port's VTS. The outcome of this case could well have important implications for VTS and I will report on any developments as they become available.

JCB



Karen Danielsen. Photo: Inguar Andersson

PENSION NEWS

THE SECRETARIAT

ACTUARIAL AND INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY REVIEW

At the end of 2004 the Trustees decided to carry out a review of the Fund's actuarial and investment consultancy provider (as far as I can ascertain this is the first one in 33 years). Invitations to Tender were sent out to the main four providers, including the incumbent Watson Wyatt, and interviews were carried out. Two firms impressed the Trustees, but at the end of the day it was Aon Consulting that the Trustees selected. So we now have a new actuary coming to grips with the idiosyncrasies of the PNPf while carrying out a triennial valuation.

VALUATION AS AT 31 DEC 2004

The Fund is currently undergoing a triennial valuation as at 31 December 2004. By mid February the valuation data had been submitted to the actuary and the draft accounts followed on a month later. It is hoped to have the preliminary results available to the Trustees by late April with an aim to finalise details in May.

The Trustees will then review the present strategic investment policy of the fund in light of the changed investment climate, the Fund's financial position and its liability profile at the end of 2004

CHANGES IN PENSIONS REGULATION

As from 6 April 2005 there have been a few changes in pensions regulations. This date sees the establishment of a New Kind of Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund.

The Pensions Regulator (TPR)

The Pensions Regulator will take the place of the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) set up under the 1995 Pensions Act. With the new title comes new powers. The new Regulator will build on the success of Opra, but will be more proactive and will focus its activities on the key risks to members' benefits. These activities include:

- Protect the benefits of members of work-based pension schemes;
- Promote the good administration of work-based pensions; and
- Reduce the risk of situations arising which may lead to claims for compensation from the Pensions Protection Fund.

Guidance on compliance with pensions legislation and various codes of practice setting out standards of conduct and practice will be provided by the TPR. In April two codes will take effect; on whistle blowing and notifiable events. These codes can be found on the TPR's website <http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk>

The Pensions Protection Fund (PPF)

This Fund applies to final salary schemes only and aims to help members of schemes when an employer becomes insolvent and the scheme does not have sufficient fund to pay the expected level of benefits. Initially the PPF will be funded by a levy on the scheme of:

- £15 for active members, pensioners and widows;
- £5 for deferred members

It is expected that the levy will double next year

The benefits to be protected will be:

- Pensioners will receive 100% of entitlement capped at £27,778; and
- Actives and deferreds 90% of entitlement capped at £25,000

BUDGET MARCH 2005

On 16th March 2005 the Chancellor delivered his last budget before the General Election. Some of the measures were directly aimed at winning over the grey vote. £1.8 billion of the spending measures include:

- £200 Council tax refund to pensioners in 2005/06.
- doubling of the starting threshold of stamp duty land tax to £120,000.
- free off-peak bus travel for over 65s from April 2005.
- increase in Child Tax Credit in line with earnings until 2007-08.
- inheritance tax allowance to be raised by £36,000 over 3 years to £300,000.
- increased spending on education.

TAX ALLOWANCES

Single Person

Aged under 65	£4,895
Aged 65-74	£7,090
Aged 75+	£7,220
Aged income limit	£19,500

Married Couple's Allowance

Aged under 75	£5,905
Aged 75 and over	£5,975
Age income limit	£19,500

Blind Person Allowance

£1,610

Income Tax Bands

Starting rate	10%	0 - £2,090
Basic rate	22%	£2,090 - £32,400
Higher rate	40%	Over £32,400

Pensions Earning Cap

The pensions earning cap for all post April 1989 joiners of occupational pension schemes has been raised to £105,600 for the 2005/06 tax year. This cap will be superseded by legislation due to come into effect on 6 April 2006.

Civil Partnership Acts

This Act takes effect from December 2005 and from this date couples who enter into a civil partnership will be taxed in the same way as married couples.

*Debbie Marten
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Retirements

*November 2004
to January 2005*

GT Harrington	Manchester	Dec
M MacLeod	Inverness	Dec
RW Orme	Aberdeen	Jan
WH Range	Southampton	Nov
BW Williams	Liverpool	Nov

Pensioners Deceased

November 2004 - January 2005

JC Attwood	<i>Medway</i>
RW Brown	<i>Portsmouth</i>
HC Higgins	<i>SE Wales</i>
G Hogg	<i>Forth</i>
GM Jones	<i>London-West</i>
RM King	<i>Humber</i>
M Lee	<i>Medway</i>
RW Pelling	<i>Southampton</i>
GW Scully	<i>Manchester</i>
FA Sowden	<i>Falmouth</i>
RW Snowdon	<i>Hartlepool</i>
PG Taylor	<i>Aberdeen</i>
JG Yarrow	<i>London North</i>

CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

It was with sadness that we received the news of Lord James Callaghan's death.

Lord Callaghan was the President of our Association from 1963 until 1976 when he was the MP for Cardiff South East. Lord Callaghan oversaw the introduction of the PNP in 1971, the Steering Committee on Pilotage (SCOP) and was a true friend to pilots during his tenure as President.

We offer our heartfelt condolences to his family.

DfT

The PMSC Compliance Working Group continues to meet, overseeing the Pilots National Occupation Standards, VTS Policy Steering Group, the Compliance Assurance of the PMSC and Pilots Assessment Criteria. The lack of progress that is being made towards producing a pilot's qualification has been expressed at these meetings. The Warsash Maritime Centre has presented a report to the DfT entitled 'Pilotage Assessment Criteria' that proposes changes in relation to the knowledge components of the NOS and the UKMPA has responded to their document. A copy of our response is available to any member on request. It is apparent that certain organizations are trying to 'muddy the waters', especially the outstanding issue of PEC standards that the DfT fully support.

The 'Port Safety Bill' presented to parliament by the DfT was not accepted for consideration but will be presented again when the opportunity arises following the election. A 1st draft of our proposed amendments to the 1987 Pilotage Act has been completed and this will be discussed at the May Section Committee meeting and debated at the IDM.

Working Time Regulations (WTR)

The Chairman of CHIRP, Professor Tony Nicholson, has called for a study into fatigue in the Maritime and Ports Industry. He has appointed Professor Mike Barnett

(Board member of CHIRP) to head this study. Mike is Head of the Department for Human Resources at the Southampton Institute. I will be involved with Mike on this study. At a meeting he attended recently at the MCA he was informed that the Health and Safety Branch is overseeing a project studying fatigue.

The DfT, Ports Division (the Shipping Minister) and the T&G (Tony Woodley) are in correspondence regarding the WTR and its impact on tugs crews and Pilots.

The legal department of the DTI is studying pilotage and the WTR but have yet to make a statement on their findings.

I have secured the facility, through Mike Powell, Director Maritime CHIRP to have any pilots roster arrangements put into the Quiniteq fatigue management computer programme for appraisal if you so wish. Please note that the same procedure of confidentiality will operate as in the case of CHIRP reports.

The UKMPA through Richard Wild, Harwich and Deputy Representative, has started a dialogue with the British Airline Pilots Association regarding working practices and fatigue. Richard will be reporting on any meetings he has with the Airline pilots and will take a cautious approach.

Questions were asked to HMG in the House of Lords regarding the responsibility of PECs, promulgation of shoal soundings and the PMSC working group in order to quote the response to Districts experiencing problems. It is pleasing to note that in all cases it has had the desired effect.

LEGAL

At a meeting recently organized by the T&G and UKMPA between the Wisbech Pilots and Fenland District Council a satisfactory conclusion was reached regarding outstanding contractual financial issues. A further meeting has been arranged for the 25th of April to discuss amendments and updating of the contract.

Belfast, Orkneys and SE Wales are still involved in solving contractual issues. The T&G are involved in Belfast and 'Blake Laphorn Linnell' is working with the Orkney and SE Wales Pilots.

EUROPE

The UK government takes over the Presidency of the EU in the second half of this year. In recent statements by HMG it is obvious that they are wholeheartedly supporting the EU liberalization of the Transport sector. This fills me with

foreboding when considering our stance on the EUPP (2). EMPA has been invited to a public meeting on the proposed EUPP (2) to be held on the 14th of June to present our position; namely our opposition to the inclusion of pilotage as a commercial operation in the directive.

ETCS

Attempts are being made to curtail this project at the AGM in Poland in June by the Dutch and German Associations. This will have to be opposed if we wish the project to be completed to the level that we wish to present to the EU Commission. We need a safeguard in place to counter attempts by member states to lower the standards of a pilot's qualification. The activities of certain organizations involved in the PMSC Compliance Working Group leave no doubt this.

MarNIS

This project is underway and the second meeting was held recently in Oslo. The work package for each participating country has been established and tasks have been consigned to the 'expert pilots'. Joe Wilson has taken over as our lead 'expert pilot' on the project.

Please Note:

There is a vacancy for our second 'expert pilot' on the MarNIS project. Anyone interested in this position please contact me. T&TC members and Deputy representatives will be given first consideration.

CHIRP

This confidential reporting system is dealing with many reports and pilots are raising issues on a regular basis. When you have tried every avenue to resolve an issue, without success, contact CHIRP.

To conclude on a good note, Geoff Taylor informs me that IMPA has secured agreement at the recent IALA meeting that SBP (Shore Based Pilotage) will not form part of any document or philosophy that is forthcoming from IALA. I will offer a prize to the first member to identify the next attempt at introducing it in a new guise from our friends in London.

*Captain LG Cate
Chairman, UKMPA*

CHIRP

*Confidential Hazardous
Incident Reporting Programme*

Full details of this important
organisation are available on the
CHIRP website at:

<http://chirp-admin.co.uk/chirp-maritime/>

T&T REPORTS

Mobiles

The T&T were asked by Section Committee to carry out a survey on the use of Mobile phones by Pilots in the workplace in response to the MAIB Report on the grounding of the Attilio Ievoli in the Western Solent on the 3rd June 2004. In the report the MAIB stated 'Poor Bridge Team management on the vessel resulted in a lack of accurate vessel positional awareness and an inappropriate division of tasks. The use of the mobile telephone distracted the master from his primary responsibilities.' A recommendation made in the report is for the ICS to 'Introduce a routine of restricted use of mobile telephones in pilotage and other restricted waters'

Before entering into a full blown study to ascertain the usage of mobiles by Pilots we decided in the first instance to send out a letter, via the UKMPA Office in Transport House, to all Districts in order to determine if indeed a full survey is called for. Responses to date have been received from 9 Districts and the T&T will consider at our next meeting if we have sufficient information from these responses to reply adequately to the Section Committee. As you can expect these are varied but in a number of Districts it is a requirement of the job to carry a phone and the CHA provide them but in all responses to date the phones are either switched off or set in the discrete mode during the manoeuvring phase of the pilotage.

Fatigue

On the issue of fatigue the same MAIB report makes reference to a Fatigue Analysis tool developed for the MAIB by QinetiQ. The work/rest periods prior to the incident were analysed using this tool and on this occasion fatigue was not deemed to be an issue. It is interesting to note that such a tool exists and I believe the HM in Southampton is hoping to use this tool to determine if our current working practices would pass scrutiny by the MAIB if a Pilot is involved in an incident.

Gareth Rees,
Chairman T&T Committee

The Gecko Helmet


A recent controversial development with respect to Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) has been the implementation at Harwich for compulsory wearing of the Gecko helmet as used by the RNLI. Pilots have complained that these helmets, having been supplied virtually without any consultation or trial are heavy, cumbersome and impair hearing by covering the ears. They also appear to be unnecessary for pilots where the incidents of head injuries are thankfully minimal. We are very fortunate on the T&T in having Keith Thatcher from the RNLI as a member of the Technical & Training Committee and Gareth Rees the T&T chairman raised these concerns with him who sent the following (edited) response.

"The Gecko helmet has been used by RNLI for 8 years and all inshore lifeboat

crew are required to wear it but onboard the all weather boats the crew need only wear it when launching/recovery or during helicopter operations. There is an inner liner available and this is inflatable to provide good fit for a wide range of head sizes. There are no reports of discomfort as the pressure in the lining is adjusted by the individual to suit his/her head size. The Mk10 currently used doesn't have a webbing cradle over the head to absorb the load but it does have a foam lining that is intended to perform the same function. Following concerns over the loss of hearing when using the helmet the RNLI have changed the design of the Mk10 to have a cutaway over the ears". Although most ports have decided that their risk assessments have not identified a need for specific head protection ABP Humber are apparently also now requiring that their pilots wear the Gecko helmet. Obviously such a move by two major ports does risk having a knock-on effect to other ports so this is a development that we will need to monitor closely. From the information available it does not appear that the Gecko offers any advantages over the standard "Wimpy Lid" or a cycle helmet, or for that matter a uniform cap!

PS The dictionary definition of Gecko: *"Any of various usually small tropical and subtropical lizards of the family Gekkonidae, having toes padded with setae containing numerous suction cups that enable them to climb on vertical surfaces"*. Now there's an idea. A pair of Gecko shoes and gloves would definitely be a useful piece of kit for boarding and landing!!

JCB



AMICALE INTERNATIONALE CAP HORNIER THE BRITISH SECTION



In May 1937 a group of retired French sailing ship masters held a banquet in St Malo to honour Professor George Delarney, chair of the Department of Navigation. They there and then formed the "Association Amicale des Capitaines au Long Cours Cap Horniers", AICH. Their aims are the same today, "to promote and strengthen the ties of comradeship which bind together a unique body of men and women who embody the distinction of having sailed round Cape Horn in a commercial sailing vessel, and to keep alive in various ways memories of the stout ships that regularly sailed on voyages of exceptional difficulty and peril, and of the endurance, courage and skill of the sailors who manned them".



There were various classes of membership; *Albatross*, who had commanded a sailing ship round Cape Horn, *Mollyhawk*, who had served in a sailing ship round Cape Horn and was subsequently a master mariner, *Cape Pigeon*, who had rounded Cape Horn in a sailing ship but was not directly involved in the handling of the ship. There were also Sympathisers (Friends) who had furthered the interests of the Association. The first Congress was held in St Malo in 1938, this was entirely French and, in 1948, a similar congress was held. It was decided then, by the AICH council that membership should be extended to other countries thus establishing it as an international organisation with affiliated national sections. The first to join were the Belgians in 1949, followed by Sweden in 1953 and Germany in 1955. Germany has always had a large membership as their four-masted barques *Padua/Kruzenshtern*, *Priwall*, *Peking*, *Passat*, *Magdalene Vinnen/Kommodore Johnson/Sedov* and *L'Avenir/Admiral Karpfanger* in the 1920s and 30s carried at least 40 trainees on every ocean-going voyage as well as having apprentices on board the Erikson square-riggers.

In 1957 the British section of AICH was formed by Cdr CLA Woollard, the inaugural AGM was held on the HQS Wellington in London. Captain H Treaby Heale was elected as Chairman and the committee included M Lee. Finland and the Aland Islands formed two separate sections in 1961, they had the greatest number of Albatrosses, thirty in all, their square-riggers were still sailing round Cape Horn in 1949 when the *Pamir* and *Passat* made the last commercial unpowered voyages. Other countries such as Holland, America, Australia, New Zealand and Chile also became members.

Alan Villiers, the author of many books on sailing ships and our last Albatross, wrote of visiting the Bournemouth branch of the British section in 1971: "*eight wonderful old boys, most of them octogenarians, except one aged 92, all with the stamp of the sea still on their open faces, the snap of command in their speech. The talk was of great ships long gone, the hardness of the life and the astonishing way it worked out. All had been apprentices, most had been second mates in sail, all had their masters certificates before they went into steam. They'd been senior masters in Royal Mail, Cunard and Union Castle, Trinity House Pilots, marine superintendents or surveyors, London dock masters, insurance appraisers – the cream of the profession*". The British section at its peak had surviving Cape Horners from the clipper ships *Thermopylae*, *Blackadder* and *Cymba*. Most of them had served their time in the last steel bulk carriers such as the *Kilmallie*, *Port Jackson*, *William Mitchell*, *Lawhill*, *Grace Harwar*, *Herzogin Cecilie*, *Pamir*, *Parma*, *Passat*, *Olivebank* etc. We also had, until their own sections were formed, Australians, New Zealanders and Americans in the British section. Irving Johnson, an American, made a film on board the four-masted barque *Peking* on passage from Hamburg, round Cape Horn to Talcahuano in Chile in 1929/30. This is a classic account of a large square-rigger sailing 8,000 tons of ship and cargo "*where we want her to go, not necessarily where she wants to go*". The heavy weather

photography is the best ever recorded, her decks are full of water, four men at the wheel and 00 canvas storm sails blown out. On arrival in Talcahuano the use of the local tug is turned down and Captain Jihrs "beat the ship up the harbour like a yacht". He then carried out a running moor under sail, a manoeuvre which Laiesz masters had carried out on many occasions. I can recall doing a running moor in Gravesend Reach (for an extra charge on the A form of course) with a powered ship – it was not easy to get it right the first time. AICH have held 52 International Congresses in ports as far apart as Sydney and Helsinki, the latter congress was partially held on board the new gas turbine powered *Finnjet* running between Helsinki and Travemunde. The contrast between travelling in luxury at 32 knots with our apprenticeship days was vivid. Fortunately the managing owner of Finnlines at the time, Heikki Holma, was also President of the Finnish AICH, he had sailed in their small barque *Favell* in the 1930s.

Three international congresses have been held in the UK, at Southampton in 1967, Greenwich in 1978 and Bristol in 1990. These were all well attended and it was a pleasure to see and hear Cape Horners hauling on ropes and singing sea shanties on the *Cutty Sark*. In 2000 at Mariehamn, home port of the last sailing ship owner, Gustaf Erikson, it was decided at the Federal Council meeting, that as AICH members were ageing and declining in numbers, that the Amicale should be wound up in 2003. The *Cutty Sark* Tall Ships Race visit to the Aland Islands coincided with this congress and it was a pleasure to see the training ships and their crews mingling with ancient mariners. The perfectly preserved four-masted barque *Pommern*, (built on the Clyde in 1903 and moored permanently in Mariehamn, unchanged since the day she was put into service), towered over the largest of the training ships – described by one hide-bound German Cape Horner as "motor ships decorated with sails". Two years were required to satisfy and complete the acres of paper-work required by French bureaucracy to wind up an official organisation such as this and it is with thanks to our International Secretary Captain Roger Ghys (ex-Master of the Belgium sail training ship *Mercator*), and his band of helpers that all was accomplished in that time.

On May 14 2003 in St Malo where it was born in 1937 AICH was formally wound up with some sadness but in a true spirit of Cape Horn. All our financial assets were used to celebrate this last congress, we went out in a splendid fashion, my wife Kate, our son Matthew and I will remember those days for a long time. Cape Horn is not dead in the UK we had formed International Association of Cape Horners (IACH) some years ago to carry forward that tradition. IACH is made up of those who have sailed round Cape Horn under sail alone, we have very strict rules concerning the manner in which this is done. The fact remains that no one can sail round Cape Horn as those large sailing ships did – everyone has to satisfy some acronymic requirement or other - but the challenge, tradition and rite of passage remain.

I have listed those AICH British members who were Pilots, there may be others.

Captain Bruce Bell, Southampton. Two roundings in the Mountstewart 1920/22.

Captain Hector Blemings, Gravesend Channel. Three roundings: Wray Castle 1916/19 and Terpsichore (as second mate) 1919/22.

Captain Harry Fountain, Boston. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.

Captain Douglas Galloway, Wellington. One rounding, Penang 1938.

Captain Victor Harbord, Humber. Five roundings, Beechbank 1907/11

Captain Andrew Keyworth, Lyttelton. One rounding, Pamir 1947.

Captain Francis Kirk, Southampton. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.
Captain M. Lee, Orwell, Thames and Medway. One rounding, Passat 1948. President of AICH/IACH since 1982.

Captain William. Liley, River Thames. One rounding, Carradale 1913.

Captain L. Peverley. Gravesend Channel. Five roundings: Robert Duncan 1905/10, Bengairn 1910/11, Beechbank 1911/12 (2nd Mate), Kilmallie 1912/13 (Mate).

Captain John Simpson. Forth. Three roundings, Garthsnaid 1919/22.

Captain William Sutherland. Gravesend Channel. One rounding, Archibald Russell 1932. President AICH 1980-1982.

PHOTOS IDENTIFIED

On page 12 of the October 2004 issue of The Pilot there were two photographs for which information was sought.

Once again Harwich Haven pilot Andy Adams has provided the following fascinating and detailed information.

The Clyde Launch:



Prior to WW2 the Clyde pilots had a semi cruising cutter the *Cumrae*. After 1941 they also had a proper cruising cutter, most probably the ex steam yacht *Queen of Scots*. In 1944 the need for the cruising cutter was reduced and she was withdrawn, being replaced by a small pilot boat the *Gantock*. Between 1944 and 06/1945 the Clyde pilots had the use of HMS *Skylark*, a small steam yacht which had been used as a barrage balloon vessel. The black caps in the photo suggest WW2 and this leads me to the view that this vessel was a replacement for *Skylark*. A review of the shipbuilding magazines and journals for the period would probably be the best source for further information.

The London pilot cutter:



The London No.1 cutter is *Pioneer*. The Dungeness cruising cutters were based at Dover hence the fact that she is anchored in Dover Harbour for the purpose of coaling and storing.

Built 1891 by Wm Denny of Dumbarton, she was the first purpose built steam cruising pilot cutter in Britain. She served continuously at the Dungeness station rotating with No.2 *Guide* also built in 1891. She was manned by 5 officers and 8 crew and had accommodation for 24 pilots.

The sailing pilot ketches No.3 *Wellington* and No.4 *Vigilant* were employed as tenders to the steam cutters at Dungeness.

In 1906, the introduction of two new steam cutters at Dover led to the decision to establish a steam cutter at the Shipwash station and *Pioneer* was transferred to Harwich and renumbered No.7. The *Guide* remained at Dover as tender and *Wellington* was sold whilst *Vigilant* transferred temporarily to the Isle of Wight District.

Whilst on duty at the Shipwash station the *Pioneer* was tendered by sailing cutters from Harwich. In 1912 the Shipwash station was closed and a single station in the North Channel established at the Sunk. *Pioneer* then transferred back to Dover and reverted to No.1.

The *Guide* and *Pioneer* then took turns as the Dungeness tender as well as taking rotational duty for the Sunk and Dungeness stations.

With the introduction of a third new cutter in 1914 *Guide* was sold to Canada and *Pioneer* was relegated solely to tender duty at Dungeness.

1924 she was renamed *Preceder* to make way for a new *Pioneer*.

1925 Sold to Pilotage du Gironde, renamed Chevalier.

1935. Broken up

Official Number 98971

Length 114' 03"

Breadth 21' 00"

Moulded Depth 11' 04"

Compound 2 cylinders steam reciprocating machinery by M Paul of Dumbarton 82rhp

Signal Letters MHGF

Gross Tonnage 156

Net Tonnage 24

PS There was speculation from another correspondent that the Guide and Pioneer were the same vessel but had removable name boards which were swapped over when the vessel changed operating stations. Further to this Andy revisited his archives and has confirmed that:

The *Pioneer* and *Guide* were two different vessels but were built together (456 & 457) as sister ships. The interchangeable name boards were the location boards DOVER and HARWICH used when the vessels changed cruising ground but Andy's research indicates that these boards were only introduced in the 1920's

No.2 *The Guide*:

1891 Built for the Dungeness station,

1914 replaced by Patrol and sold to J E Bernier of Levis Lauzon, Quebec.

1923 Sold to Cie Navigation de la Baie de Bras d' Or.

1926 Sold to North Shore Trading Co. of Quebec.

1926 Sunk in St Lawrence.

FORTIUS


In the October 2004 issue of *The Pilot* I reported on the enquiry into the grounding of the passenger vessel *Astor* and commented on the fact that the *Antipodes* seemed to be providing a lead in analysing incidents involving pilots and making recommendations on complex pilotage issues. In the case of the *Astor* it was evident that there was a dominant master who ignored the pilot and during the manoeuvre communicated in Russian with his bridge team thus totally excluding the pilot.



This last year has seen the master/pilot relationship being examined in detail and an incident involving the bulk carrier *Fortius* in the Australian port of Port Kembla provides a prime example of how a routine pilotage manoeuvre by an experienced pilot can rapidly deteriorate into a disaster which ends up with the investigators submitting both the master and pilot to detailed interrogation as to the chain of events. Under such interrogation it is inevitable that each party will defend their own actions and the investigators will then focus on bridge procedures to come to a conclusion as to the actual cause. The *Fortius* case highlights the inadequacy of the basic methods of recording events on board the average merchant ship and the report makes several recommendations that underline the importance for a pilot not just to prepare an MPEX form but make sure that the master signs it as confirmation that the critical points of the transit have been discussed and agreed. The following has been extracted from the official ATSB report.

The incident 15th April 2002

Arrival at Port Kembla involves an approach to the breakwater on heading of about 215. Once through the breakwater there is an 80 turn into a cut marked by leading lights on a heading of about 300 to the inner harbour. In the case of the *Fortius* the manoeuvre to the



loading berth involved swinging the vessel in the inner harbour through about 240 and backing up into a cutting to berth port side alongside on a heading of 178. Four tugs were used on this vessel (centre leads F&A and "push-pull" F&A on starboard side).

The approach through the breakwaters and into the cut went without problems and the tugs were all fast prior to entering the inner harbour in preparation for the swing. Once in the inner harbour the tugs recorded that the vessel's speed was normal but during the swing the vessel drifted too far to the north and the bow made heavy contact with the southern end of the intended berth and one of the after tugs was damaged when it became trapped between the port quarter of the vessel and the eastern end of a general purpose berth. The intended berth was rendered unusable by the contact and the *Fortius* had to be berthed on an adjacent loading berth not designed for that size of vessel. The incident resulted in a major claim.

The ship

Built 2001
 Summer DWT: 171,500 tonnes
 LOA: 289 metres
 Draught at time of incident: 10.6m trimmed 3m by the stern.
 Part loaded with 55,000 tonnes
 Engine: Standard air start
 Right handed propeller
 Manning: Polish Master, Ukrainian officers and crew.

The pilot had been working at the port for 6½ years and had received comprehensive training and annual assessments.

Events leading up to the incident

The accounts of the events leading up to the incident provided by the Master and pilot differ to such an extent that it is impossible to obtain a clear indication as to what stage of the manoeuvre the events transformed a standard approach into an incident. Somewhat (un)surprisingly, although a new ship, *Fortius* was not fitted with an engine movement recorder so the movements were recorded by the OOW in traditional fashion using pencilled entries in a "bell book". There was evidence that entries had been altered between the incident and the investigation. The factor of the entries only being noted to the minute also hindered the investigation.

All communications between the pilot and tugs are recorded at Port Kembla and this, coupled with the records from the ship's course recorder provided the only accurate records of events.

The pilot's account

Upon boarding the pilot claimed he explained the berthing manoeuvre to the Master using an MPEX form consisting of a chart and diagrams. He did not ask the master to sign this. He

maintained that he was not shown a pilot card and obtained the engine data from a table adjacent to the engine console.

During the swing in the inner harbour only the two fwd tugs were used with the lead tug taking the bow to starboard and the shoulder tug leaning back to take off the headway. The stern tug worked into a position on the port quarter in anticipation of a command to take the stern to port. The engine was running at slow ahead.

About halfway through the swing the pilot claims that he ordered "stop engine" and the order was passed to the shoulder tug to stop pulling. He then went out onto the port bridge wing alone where he ordered slow astern. Just prior to the contact the pilot was concerned that the swing was slowing and that remedial action to prevent the stern from contacting the general purpose berth was required and ordered the two aft tugs to take the stern to starboard. The stern tug was unable to comply with this request due to lack of space and became briefly trapped between the ship and a mooring dolphin suffering some damage. The tug on the starboard quarter was able to comply but parted the tow line. Following the bow contacting the lower end of the coal berth the swing continued to starboard (verified by the course recorder), the stern cleared the GP berth and the vessel was subsequently berthed on the No. 1 berth without further incident.

The Master's account

Upon boarding the pilot the Captain claims that the Second Mate showed the pilot card to the pilot but although this had the pilot's name entered when produced at the enquiry the pilot had not signed it. The Master also maintains that he was not shown a passage plan and during the inward passage had to twice ask the pilot questions concerning the proposed manoeuvre.

The Master stated that he accompanied the pilot onto the port bridge wing (with the engine running slow ahead and the wheel hard to starboard) where they remained all the time during the turning of the vessel in the Inner Harbour. The master stated that it was he who ordered the astern movements and that the rudder be put amidships from full starboard rudder about two minutes before the contact with number two coal loader. He acknowledged that the pilot made the 'dead slow astern' and 'slow astern' orders, but only after the Master ordered him to do so. Upon seeing that the orders were not having any effect on the vessel the Master ordered 'full astern'.

Analysis

The only written record of engine movements was made in the bridge bell book. If contemporaneous, this would support the account of the master, mate and helmsman.

The recorded conversations with the tugs revealed a general lack of specific instruction as to the power to be applied and on one instruction to the port quarter tug just prior to impact the pilot recalled requesting it to push the stern to starboard but the actual instruction issued was to pull the stern to port.

The significant and critical differences between the accounts of the pilot and the ship's staff mean that one or the other is untrue. The absence of any independent recording of engine movements or the orders given by those on the bridge makes it impossible to verify which account is true.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular individual or organisation.

There was no evidence to suggest that SA *Fortius* experienced any equipment failure or that the engine and other machinery were a causal factor in the contact. Based on the evidence available, the

following factors are considered to have contributed to the incident:

- 1 SA *Fortius* developed a large drift angle, which resulted in the ship being too far to the north in the turning basin.
- 2 The drift angle was not detected by the pilot.
- 3 The engine was put to 'slow ahead' at about 1356, when the intended engine order was 'slow astern'.
- 4 The pilot did not take sufficient notice of the tachometer and rudder angle indicator.
- 5 The bridge team work was negligible, resulting in a breakdown of effective and safe communications between the pilot and the ship's staff on the bridge.
- 6 The master did not take sufficient steps to ensure that he was aware of the intended manoeuvre in the inner basin.
- 7 There was a lack of specific direction to the tugs by the pilot. He did not follow the 'Standard Orders to Tugs' issued by the Port Kembla Port Corporation in December 1999.

Although not contributory factors, it is also considered that:

- * The practice of recording engine movements to the nearest minute is inappropriate when manoeuvring in confined waters.
- * The maintenance of the ship's bell book was of a low standard.

Recommendations

- * Pilots use the procedures as laid out in 'Standard Orders to Tugs' issued by the Port Kembla Port Corporation in December 1999, when directing tug manoeuvres.
- * Port authorities, where not otherwise equipped, should consider the introduction of an electronic aid, with track prediction capability, to assist pilots with the berthing of ships.
- * Pilots should consider carrying a portable voice recorder.
- * Pilots should ensure that the "bell book" entries are written in ink rather than pencil
- * All ports should consider publishing their general port entry and berthing manoeuvre plans on the Internet. This would provide port users with direct access to port information (or indirect access through ship's agents), permitting masters and officers to plan passages as recommended in the International Chamber of Shipping's 'Bridge Procedures Guide'.
- * Periodic meetings between pilots and tug masters be reintroduced at an operational level.
- * When piloting ships, pilots should consider means by which they can verify all orders given by them.

Whilst it is now a requirement for certain classes of vessel to be fitted with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) this incident confirms that many ship owners will only fit equipment that is mandatory and the absence of an engine movement recorder on a vessel built in 2001 says it all!

As for the fifth recommendation this has now been superseded by IMO Resolution A960 which recognises the impracticality (indeed undesirability) of a Master attempting to complete a berth to berth passage plan but in turn places an enhanced obligation on the pilot to ensure that the Master is fully briefed in all aspects of the intended pilotage act.

This incident will no doubt be entered on the insurer's books as a claim resulting from "pilot error" thus also highlighting the dubious statistics published by insurers.

There again, if the view of insurers is that any incident occurring when a pilot is embarked will be put down to pilot error and since they foot the bill regardless perhaps it doesn't matter after all? As one of my colleagues suggested "If there are no records and no paper trail nobody can be incriminated"!!

JCB

The full report can be found at:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/marine/pdf/178_sa_fortius.pdf

UKMPA AT WORK

In addition to local duties SC members are being kept very busy by the need to attend the many meetings and seminars which could have an effect on pilotage matters. Space doesn't permit full details of this involvement to be included in these pages but members should take note of the circulars sent out to local Districts. The key areas of involvement at the moment are:

Joe Wilson: Vice Chairman representing the UKMPA on Maritime Navigation and Information Services (MarNIS) forum. This is a major EU project and details can be obtained from: www.marnis.org

John Pretswell: In addition to the considerable duties of Treasurer he has attended meetings with the T&G with regards to EU revised Ports directive (EUPP2) and also attended the AGM of the Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS).

NB The revised ports directive is receiving much criticism from all sides but one worrying development is the direct support by Tony Blair for an open competitive free market Europe and this is in danger of becoming the official UK position thus overriding the opposition to the Directive by UK Major Ports Group as well as the UKMPA.

Don Cockrill has been kept extremely busy with the vast correspondence and meetings with the MCA and DfT over the review of the PMSC. Supported by other SC members there has been some clarification of the procedures to adopt if it is believed that a CHA is in breach of the PMSC and this has been interpreted as follows:

- Make the complaint to HM
- If not satisfied take it to the board
- If still not satisfied take it to the MCA
- Take it the Secretary of State
- If they cannot resolve it notify UKMPA as evidence that 'self regulation doesn't work'.

There is still resistance to formally introducing a pilotage qualification and incorporating standards into the PMSC by the ports representatives and the Chamber of Shipping who still maintain that they "do not see the need". It has been pointed out to the COS that it must be in the interests of their members to have well trained competent pilots and this novel suggestion seemed to take them by surprise! The costs involved in attending the meetings and working on the standards have also been used by these groups as an excuse. The UKMPA have pointed out that we do (and will) happily do it all for free!! Other points that the UKMPA are raising are the misnomer term of Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) with suggestions of recognition of what the certificate actually grants by changing the title to something along the lines of a Limited Pilotage Certificate. This would then be subjected to similar standards and qualifications as applicable to a pilot on the same class of vessel. I believe that Fowey already use the term Local Pilotage Certificate but formal change would require amending the Pilotage Act and this is an area that the UKMPA are currently working on ready for the new Government after May 5th.

President Lord Tony Berkeley has asked the following Parliamentary Questions:

PILOTAGE EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES

Q: *Who is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the operation of the marine pilotage exemption certificates?*

Lord Davies of Oldham: Competent harbour authorities are responsible for the issuing and operation of pilotage exemption certificates.

Q: *In respect of each competent harbour authority, what offences have been committed relating to pilotage exemption certificate and how many convictions there have been in the last five years?*

Lord Davies: The Government do not hold records relating to marine pilotage exemption certificates.

PORT MARINE SAFETY CODE

Q: *What are the terms of reference of the Marine and Coastguard Agency's review of the port marine safety code; which ports have been found to be non-compliant; and when the final report will be published?*

Lord Davies: The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is not reviewing the port marine safety code, and no report is due to be published. However, the agency is working with port authorities on compliance assurance issues on an ongoing basis.

ENGLISH CHANNEL

Q: *Who is responsible for informing the authorised pilots operating within a competent harbour authority about any adverse shoal depths discovered, following a survey of the English Channel?*

Lord Davies: Harbour authorities are responsible for publishing appropriate hydrographic information, including warnings on recently identified navigational hazards, for the area within the harbour.

Waters, such as the English Channel, outside the jurisdiction of the competent harbour authority are surveyed according to arrangements agreed through the Civil Hydrography Programme. Survey areas are prioritised using a risk assessment methodology.

KRISTIAN PEDERSEN: Executive member for region 6 and local secretary for SE Wales.

At the time of going to press the UKMPA had received the shock news that Kristian Pedersen had been summarily dismissed by APB. Kristian has appealed against his dismissal and the hearing has been set for Monday 18 April. Kristian is being fully supported for his hearing by both the T&G and a legal team.

King George's Fund for Sailors (KGFS)

Since last October the King George's Fund for Sailors (KGFS) charity has been renamed:



Jon Scourse, Director of Fundraising and Marketing for KGFS, explained:

"Although still formally known as King George's Fund for Sailors, Seafarers UK provides a new platform for the charity to

raise its profile with both existing and potential supporters, and therefore increase its fundraising effectiveness. By evolving the brand a new and clearer identity for the charity has been created which provides a strong message for the future."

Seafarers UK is organising three major fund raising initiatives this year with various partners:

ABSEILING from a selection of Trinity House lighthouses supervised by the royal Marines as follows:

South Stack	22nd May
Barns Ness	4th/5th June

Flamborough Head	11th June
Southwold	23rd July
Nash Point	30th July
Portland Bill	31st July

THE THREE PEAKS CHALLENGE
9th - 10th July

THE PICKLE CHALLENGE:

A 250 mile cycling event (Nelson & HMS Pickle) 17th -18th September

Full details from:

Website: www.kgfs.org.uk

Email: paola.martin@seafarers-uk.org


Tel: 020 7932 5977

BOOK REVIEW

Mariner's Launch

by Ray Solley

This book is interesting because although it probably is an almost first hand account of the author's early sea going career through apprenticeship to obtaining his 2nd Mate's certificate, it has been written in the manner of a novel thus enabling personalities and events to be portrayed without risk of recognition. The book is therefore an authentic account of a schoolboy leaving home to nautical college and embarking on an apprenticeship in the Merchant Navy in the 1950's. It is a light hearted and well written account of life at sea at a time when the British merchant navy dominated the world's oceans and ports. The ships are brought to life and the daily life of an apprentice on board a traditional cargo ship bristling with derricks and their associated high maintenance hoists, guys, preventers, blocks, shackles etc. will be familiar to all those of us who were fortunate to have served on board such ships. With a large compliment of officers and crew such ships ran to a leisurely schedule and again the characters encountered will be familiar. Cargo handling in port gave plenty of time off to enjoy the local sights, local (sometimes dubious) establishments and generally to relax and to set up practical jokes with rival shipping companies. The 181 pages contain many black and white photographs from various companies and colleges depicting the life of an apprentice learning the various aspects of a career in the Merchant Navy. Excellent nostalgia.



Whittles Publishing www.whittlespublishing.com
 Mariner's Launch ISBN 1-904445-03-9 Price: £16.95

OBITUARY

Lord James Callaghan



As mentioned in the Chairman's report on page 6 Past UKPA president and former Prime Minister Lord Callaghan died over Easter at the age of 92.

It is my intention to include a fitting obituary in the July issue of *The Pilot* but apart from the mainstream media tributes I have no real background detail. I would therefore be grateful if any pilots who were involved with the committee during James' presidency could provide me with their experiences, anecdotes etc.

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